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STATE HIGHWAYS AND INTERSTATE
MOTOR TRANSPORTATION
By BERNARD C. GAvIT*
I.
There have been five recent decisions of the Supreme Court of
the United States which have had to do with the problem of motor
truck transportation. These cases are: Packard v. Banton,1 Michigan
Public Utilities Conmission v. Duke,2 Buck v. Kuykendall, Bush
& Sois Company v. Maloy,4 and Frost v. Railroad Commission.5
The case of Packard v. Banton decided that there was nothing
in the United States Constitution which protected a taxi man as
against ordinances of the city of New York, which in effect pro-
hibited him from carrying on his business.
The cases of Michigan Public Utilities Commission v. Duke and
Frost v. Railroad Commission decided that a state could not force
one engaged in business as a private carrier to become a common
carrier and thereby subject to regulation by a public utilities com-
mission. The cases of Buck v. Kuykendall and Bush & Sons Com-
pany v. Maloy decided that a state cannot prohibit the use of state
highways for the operation of motor vehicles engaged in interstate
commerce.
It is the purpose of this paper to discuss the question of the
rights of a state to regulate the use of its highways as against persons
engaged in interstate commerce and it is the contention here that
the cases of Buck v. Kuykendall and Bush & Sons Company v.
Maloy are not the final word upon the questions there involved.
II.
At the outset it is well to review the law concerning the high-
ways of the country. Except in the instances where the United
States has some claim or title to particular highways the universal
rule is that the highways of a state are the property of the state.
*[Of the Indiana bar.]
1. 264 U. S. 140, 68 L. Ed. 596.
2. 266 U. S. 570, 69 L. Ed. 445.
3. 267 U. S. 307, 69 L. Ed. 623.
4. 267 U. S. 317, 69 L. Ed. 627.
5. 46 Sup. Ct. Rep. 604, 70 L. Ed. 682.
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The state may own the fee, or it may own only an easement, but the
result is the same; the highways are held by the state for use as
public thoroughfares. "The streets belong to the public, and are
primarily for the use of the public in the ordinary way." 6
The control of the streets may rest in the legislature, the county,
the city, in a public commission, or jointly in all of those agencies;
but again the result is the same, neither the state nor any of its
agencies can barter away the rights of the public to the free use of
the streets "in the ordinary way."'
The proper authorities have a right to devote the streets to
useful public purposes, provided there is left an unobstructed drive-
way for ordinary passage.8 The public authorities may, therefore,
by license or franchise give to a common carrier, or a public utility,
a right to use the streets for gain.9 The reason is not that the car-
rier may make money, but that thereby the public convenience is
served.
But nowhere is there any dissent from the proposition that the
use of the streets for purposes of gain is special and extraordinary,
and may be prohibited or conditioned as the public authorities deem
proper. Without a franchise one who is using the streets as a com-
mon carrier for hire has no property right protected by the Con-
stitution of the United States.1"
In addition to the rights of the public generally the abutting
property owners have varying private interests in the highways.
These rights, of course, the public authorities cannot deal with.'
III.
It is said that the public highways are held in trust for the people.
Does this include the people of the country generally, or merely the
people of the state? The court in the case of Buck v. Kuykendall 2
suggests that "the right to travel interstate by auto vehicle upon
the public highways may be a privilege or immunity of citizens of
6. Packard v. Banton 264 U. S. 140, at page 144.
7. Sims v. City of Frankfort 79 Ind. 446.
8. Dougherty v. Horseheads 159 N. Y. 154, 53 N. E. 799; Teage v.
Bloomington 40 Ind. App. 68.
9. Packard v. Banton supra, note 1; Barrows v. Farnum's Stage Lintes
150 N. E. (Mass.) 206.
10. Packard v. Banton 264 U. S. 140, 68 L. Ed. 596; Frick v. City of
Gary 192 Ind. 76; Desser v. Wichita 96 Kan. 820, 153 Pac. 1194, L. R. A.
1916-D 246; Denny v. City of Muncie 149 N. E. (Ind.) 639.
11. Ewbank v. Yellow Cab Co. 149 N. E. (Ind.) 647.
12. 267 U. S. 307, at page 314.
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the United States." But this would not help a corporation, for it
is not a citizen within the meaning of that constitutional provision. 3
In a similar situation there is authority that the bed of a lake,
held in trust by the state for "the people," is held only for the people
of the state.14
Finally, then, there may well be a distinction between the
rights of a non-resident citizen and a non-resident corporation to
operate as common carrier in interstate commerce. As far, however,
as the present decisions go the distinction is immaterial, for the
Supreme Court says that determining who is to use the highways
is not regulation of the use of the highways, but is a regulation of
the business of interstate commerce.
It is with that proposition that the present quarrel is to be had.
IV.
In the Buck v. Kuykendall case the court says:
"The provision here in question is of a different character. Its
primary purpose is not regulation with a view to safety or to conserva-
tion of the highways, but the prohibition of competition. It determines
not the manner of use, but the persons by whom the highway may be
used. It prohibits such use to some persons, while permitting it to oth-
ers for the same purpose and in the same manner.-Thus the provision
of the Washington statute is a regulation, not of the use of its own
highways, but of interstate commerce."
In the Frost v. Railroad Commission case the court uses similar
language. And in both cases it was assumed that the complaining
parties had no rights which were protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
The question of interstate commerce was not involved in the
Frost case, and the case finally merely holds that a state cannot grant
a privilege upon condition that one give up a constitutional right, in
that case the right to operate as a private carrier. (And it may be
that, after all, that too is a privilege and not a right.)
V.
It appears impossible to the writer to reconcile the decision of
the Supreme Court in the case of Packard v. Banton with the de-
cision in the case of Buck v. Kuykendall. The first case held that
"a distinction must be observed between the regulation of an activity
13. Western Turf Assn. v. Greenberq 204 U. S. 359, 51 L. Ed. 520.
14. Lake San;d Company v. State 68 Ind. App. 439, 120 N. E. 714.
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which may be engaged in as a matter of right, and one carried on
by government sufferance or permission"; that the business of oper-
ating a taxicab for hire on the public streets was strictly a privi-
lege and not a right, and its prohibition was a valid regulation of
the use of the public streets. The second case holds that the pro-
hibition of the use of the public highways to one proposing to oper-
ate motor vehicle for hire in interstate commerce is not a regulation
of the use of the highways, but is a regulation of a business. Pro-
hibition of the use of the public highways for purposes of intrastate
business is a regulation of the use of the higways; prohibition of
the use of the public highways for the Purposes of interstate business
is not a regulation of the use of the highways.
It seems almost too plain for words that when a state licenses
the use of its highways for use by a common carrier for gain, it is
in fact licensing the use of the highways and not the business of
common carrier. It is submitted that there can be no distinction
between the two situations and that the two cases are in conflict, and
that the Packard case is the correct decision. It may appear on the
face of. it that there is a regulation of business, but that is not the
true situation; it is the refusal to inaugurate or establish a business.
One of the facilities of the business is the use of the streets for gain;
it cannot be acquired without the consent of the proper authorities.
It may be that there is a fundamental right to engage in interstate
commerce, but that assumes the lawful acquisition of the facilities
with which the interstate commerce is to be carried on. Nobody,
for instance, ever supposed that because one proposed to engage in
business as a common carrier by railroad, he had the right to lay
his track down any highway, or across any property he desired.
If a city refused permission to such a one to lay tracks down the
main street there would be little argument that the city was regu-
lating interstate commerce instead of the use of its streets.15
Although there is a difference in degree between the use of
streets by a street car company or a steam railroad and its use by
motor vehicles for hire, all are uses of the highways for gain. In
all essentials the licensing of the use of streets for private business
is a regulation of the use of the streets and is not a regulation of a
business. Regulation of business presupposes that there is a busi-
ness to regulate. It is incorrect to say that the refausal to grant a
license or certificate of necessity is a prohibition of business; it is
merely the refusal to give consent to a use of the public highways.
15. 'Elliott "Railroads" (3rd ed.) Vol. 3 p. 108, et seq.
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Vi.
It must be noted that the federal control of interstate commerce
arises out of the provision of the Constitution which gives Congress
the power to regulate interstate commerce. The Supreme Court has
defined "regulate" as follows: "To regulate in the sense intended
is to foster, protect, control and restrain. ' 16 There is no authority
given Congress or any other agency to establish interstate commerce.
There is at least one decision to that effect, which is not dis-
cussed in any of the cases so far cited, and which is directly con-
tradictory to the result of the K46ykendall case. That is the case
of City of St. Louis v. Western Union Telegraph Conmpany.7
In that case the city was attempting to collect money due under
an ordinance requiring the telegraph company to pay for certain
privileges in its streets. The telegraph company pleaded that it had
established its lines in interstate commerce in pursuance to govern-
ment aid. The court said this:
"We find that the charge is imposed for the privilege of using the
streets, alleys and public places.-The city has attempted to make the
telegraph company pay for appropriating to its own and sole use a part
of the streets and public places of the city. It is seeking to collect rent.
-Whatever benefit the public may receive in the way of transporta-
tion of messages, that space (occupied by the company) is, so far as
respects its actual use for purposes of a highway and personal travel,
wholly lost to the public. By sufficient multiplication of telegraph and
telephone companies the whole space of the highway might be occupied,
and that which -vs designed for general use for purposes of travel
appropriated to the separate use of companies and for the transporta-
tion of messages.-It is a misconception, however, to suppose that the
franchise or privilege granted by the Act of 1866 carries with it the
unrestricted right to appropriate the public property of a state. It is
like any other franchise, to be exercised in subordination to public and
to private rights.-No one would suppose that a franchise from the fed-
eral government to a corporation, state or national, to construct inter-
state roads, or lines of travel, transportation or communication would
authorize it to enter upon the private property of an individual and
appropriate it without compensation.-And the principle is the same
when, under the grant of a frafichise from the national government, a
corporation assumes to enter upon property of a public nature belonging
to a state.-This rule extends to streets and highways; they are the pub-
lic property of the state."
Although the case talks about the exclusive character of the use
by telegraph poles and car tracks, the fundamental principle involved
16. In re Second Employers' Liability Cases 223 U. S. 1, 56 L. Ed. 327.
17. 148 U. S. 92, 37 L. Ed. 380.
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extends to the use by motor carriers. Anything beyond the ordinary
use of a highway for the purposes of common travel is subject to
license and regulation by the state. As suggested in the last case,
if a telegraph company may place one line of poles in the streets
because it is engaged in interstate commerce then it may place a
dozen. The rights of the public to common travel are thereby sur-
rendered to interstate commerce. In the same way if one company
may use a highway for interstate commerce by motor vehicle then
a hundred may do the same, without let or hindrance, and the rights
of the public to common travel are again surrendered to interstate
commerce.
The case last cited is distinct authority for the proposition that
there is nothing which can compel a state to devote its public prop-
erty to interstate commerce against its consent. The right to engage
in interstate commerce does not carry with it the right to force any-
one to contribute the instrumentalities with which the commerce is
to be carried on. To refuse to devote the property of the state and
of adjoining property owners in the streets to the uses of interstate
commerce is not a regulation of interstate commerce; there can be
no business until the instrumentalities have been lawfully acquired.
VII.
It has been suggested that the "freedom of interstate commerce
involves the right to make reasonable use of common state facili-
ties."' 8 There is cited for this proposition the case of Sioux Remedy
v. Cope,'8 where it was held that the enforcement in the state courts
of a cause of action arising out of the sale of goods in interstate
commerce was an incident of interstate commerce, and that certain
regulations concerning the right to sue were unreasonable burdens
on interstate commerce. It will be observed that the plaintiff in that
case had a valid right acquired by the law of the state where relief
was sought; i. e., a cause of action for the goods sold. The case
holds that the state cannot make unreasonable regulations concern-
ing the enforcement of the right. Even, then, if it be admitted that
the right to sue was a privilege, back of the privilege was a right,
and the case might well fall in the general class of cases which hold
that a state cannot grant a privilege which actually or in effect re-
quires as a condition precedent the relinquishment of a constitutional
right. But in any event the interstate commerce in that case was
18. By Charles B. Elder, in an article in ILL.INOIs LAW REVIEW XXI 166.
19. 235 U. S. 197.
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established; the privilege of suing was granted, and the state could
not burden it unreasonably. The case is similar to one where a state
would give a license to use the roads in interstate commerce and then
attempt to limit the speed of all vehicles to an unreasonable figure.
The same author cites several cases involving the right of a
state to regulate telegraph companies established on the post roads
of the United States, pursuant to legislation authorizing the use of
the roads.2 0  None of these cases contains anything contrary to the
doctrines announced in the case of City of St. Louis v. Western
Union Telegraph Company.21
Two other cases are cited in that article which appear to be
somewhat conflicting with the views here expressed. They are the
cases of West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co.,22 and Barrett v. New
York.2 3 But both cases are distinguishable.
In the first case several petitioners owned or leased certain oil
and gas wells in Oklahoma and had acquired private rights of way
for a gas pipe line into Kansas and other states, for the purpose of
conveying the gas to other states for sale and use there. A statute
of the state of Oklahoma forbade the exportation of gas, and limited
the right to cross the highways of the state with a pipe line to
companies or persons doing merely a local business. In view of the
fact that the gas could only be transported in interstate commerce by
means of pipe lines the court held the statute invalid. But an extra-
ordinary use of the highways was not there involved. As owners
of the abutting property the persons in that case had a right to egress
and ingress, which under the circumstances of that case would cer-
tainly include the right to lay the pipes in question.
In the case of Barrett v. New York24 the Supreme Court held
invalid an ordinance of the city of New York which licensed the
business of expressmen, and required licenses for drivers of all
express wagons and bonds for the driver, conditioned that he would
safely and promptly deliver all packages entrusted to his care. The
court says:
20. Pensacola Telegraph Co. V. Western Union Telegraph Co. 96 U. S.
1; Western Union Telegraph Co. V. Attorney General 125 U. S. 530; United
States v. Union Pacific R. R. Co. 160 U. S. 1; Essex v. New England Tele-
graph Co. 239 U. S. 313.
21. 148 U. S. 92.
22. 221 U. S. 229.
23. 232 U. S. 14.
24. 232 U. S. 14.
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"The requirements-cannot be regarded as imposing a fee or tax
for the use of the streets-The sections under consideration constitute
a regulation of the express 'business.' Article 1 is entitled 'Business
Requiring a License'; see. 305 containing the enumeration, provides that
'the following businesses must be duly licensed,' and sec. 306, that 'no
person shall engage in or carry on any such business without a license
therefor' under a stated penalty. The right of public control, in requir-
ing such a license, is asserted by virtue of the character of the employ-
ment."
The court held that the provision for a bond conditioned on the
safe delivery of goods was invalid as applied to interstate commerce
for the good reason that Congress had occupied the field of the obli-
gations of interstate express carriers. The court then goes on to
determine the validity of the license for drivers, and holds that it is
inseparable from the balance of the law and even if valid would fall
with the balance of the ordinance. The court does say that it be-
lieved the provision invalid, but there is no decision to that effect.
It will be observed that the ordinance as a whole was never even
sought to be sustained as a regulation of the use of streets, but as a
regulation of the business of expressing as a whole, including the
maintenance of an office, the liability for misdelivery of goods, and
other incidents of the business which had no connection with the
streets.
VIII.
.There is no real authority to support the case of Buck v.
Kwykendall, and the case of City of St. Louis v. Western Union
Telegraph Company is directly contradictory to its result.
It is submitted that the state has the right to prohibit to an
interstate carrier by motor vehicle the use of its streets. It not only
has the power to regulate the use of the streets for interstate com-
merce, but it has the duty to protect the rights of its own citizens
in their highways, which must at all times be left open to free pas-
sage for ordinary use.
Although one should be slow to dispute such great authority
as the Supreme Court of the United States, it would certainly seem
that the case of Buck v. Knykendall is not the final word on the
subject, and that there must be some retraction from that opinion.
The question is not one of expediency, but one of power; arguments
as to confusion, lack of uniformity and the desirability of motor
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transportation are beside the point. There is no more reason in
compelling a state to devote its highways to interstate commerce by
motor vehicle than there is in forcing it to devote them to interstate
commerce by steam or electric railroads.
